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Abstract. Concepts are traditionally pictured as discrete containers that bring 
together objects or qualities based on the possession of shared, uniform 
properties. This paper focuses on a contrasting notion of the concept which 
holds that concepts are defined by their capacity to reach out and connect with 
other concepts. Two theories in recent continental philosophy maintain this 
view: one from Ricoeur, the other from Deleuze and Guattari. Both are offered 
as attempts to bring art and philosophy into relation, but they differ over how 
the process of connection is theorized. With Ricoeur, a concept is only a concept 
if it is inherently predisposed to connect with others, and open to being misapplied 
through metaphor, whereas, with Deleuze and Guattari, connection is left as the 
general notion of each and every concept being mutually consistent with other 
concepts, with the consistency attributed to the external action of “bridging”. The 
author demonstrates the impact of this difference on how the philosophers 
perceive the art–philosophy relation, and argues that Ricoeur is better placed to 
provide a theory of philosophical discourse that is open to the aesthetic. Ricoeur 
can show it through metaphor, while Deleuze and Guattari can only assert or state 
an art–philosophy relation through a series of technical claims. The significance 
of the showing–saying distinction is that it can demonstrate the depth with which 
conceptual connectivity is located with the philosophers’ respective ontologies 
and, can help to reveal the value of conceptual connectivity for that ontology. 
 
Keywords: concept, connectivity, metaphorical, octopus, reference, rhizome, 
sense, show, speculative, state.
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In the history of philosophy, concepts are traditionally pictured as discrete 
containers that bring together objects or qualities based on the possession of 
shared, uniform properties, for example, Plato’s analogy of knowledge as an 
aviary in the Theaetetus1 and Aristotle’s metaphor of predicates as containers in 
Prior Analytics.2 Mathematical set theory is organized around the principle that 
there are collections of objects called “sets”, where the objects are identified as 
“members” or “elements” of a set. “Membership” is a form of “being within”, 
and so is being an element, in the sense that an element is a constituent of or a 
unit within a larger entity. The “containment” metaphor was reinforced in 1880 
by the English logician John Venn who introduces the convention of 
representing concepts as circles in order to allow syllogistic arguments to be 
represented as diagrams, known as Venn diagrams.3 
 
In contrast to this tradition, I want to consider the idea that concepts are defined 
by their capacity to reach outwards to connect with other concepts. Three 
philosophers are relevant here: Ricoeur, Deleuze and Guattari. Although there 
are three philosophers, it is two theories that are produced: one by Ricoeur, the 
other by Deleuze and Guattari. Both theories emphasize the importance of 
connection to the nature of a concept, but the nature of the connection is 
different. Both theories also examine the connection between concepts as part of 
their exploration of the relation between art and philosophy. Again, the relations 
presented are different. I argue that Ricoeur introduces what I call an “octopus” 
vision of the concept, in which the capacity of a concept to be a concentration of 
meaning is also its capacity to reach out and be applicable to other, remote 
meanings. In contrast, although Deleuze and Guattari provide a vocabulary with 
which to describe the action of connection, the results, I maintain, are a series of 
statements merely asserting that connection can happen, and a terminological 
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apparatus that is more preoccupied with territorialism than connection. The main 
difference between them, I propose, is over their stance on the use of concepts 
as referring expressions, with Ricoeur embracing the use, and Deleuze and 
Guattari rejecting it. I consider the consequence of this difference for a theory of 
conceptual connectivity and for the relation between art and philosophy. 
 
 
Art and philosophy 
 
Both Ricoeur and Deleuze and Guattari examine the connection between 
concepts as part of their exploration of the relation between art and philosophy. 
Ricoeur’s theory forms part of his account of metaphor in The Rule of Metaphor 
(La métaphore vive). Metaphor, he argues, is constitutive of our capacity to describe 
at all. To understand it, he argues, we have to take the widest view of language 
possible, where language is active, in operation, and where it has an interest; in 
other words, language as discourse. He formulates metaphor as the intersection 
of two discourses: metaphorical and speculative. Metaphorical discourse is the 
domain in which new expressions are created but not conceptualized or 
translated; it is where inventive metaphors receive their first outing. Instances of 
the discourse might be a poem, a narrative or an essay. Speculative discourse is 
the domain of the concept and, furthermore, the domain in which the concept 
can be predicated of an object. It is the discourse which focuses the play of 
meanings thrown up by metaphor into a proposition which revivifies our 
perception of the world. It is also the discourse that is at work in philosophy, 
since “it expresses the systematic nature of the conceptual” and is active 
 
in all the speculative attempts to order the “great genera”, the 
“categories of being”, the “categories of understanding”, 
“philosophical logic”, the “principal elements of representation”, or 
however one wants to express [the systematic nature of the 
conceptual].4  
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The characterization of the metaphorical and the speculative – and the fields in 
which they find expression, namely the poetic and the philosophical – as 
intersecting discourses means “intersection” is also Ricoeur’s understanding of the 
relation between art and philosophy. It also means that metaphor, in as much as 
it is constituted by the intersection of metaphorical and speculative discourse, is 
the relation between art and philosophy made manifest in a single, albeit 
tensional, form. 
 
The importance of the productive tension between metaphorical and speculative 
discourse for Ricoeur cannot be overstated. Metaphorical discourse creates the 
utterance “A is B” together with all the “nonsensical” possibilities that it implies, 
and through its encounter with the speculative, the play of possibilities is resolved 
and A’s B-like nature is conceptualized. Metaphor “is living”, he proclaims, “by 
virtue of the fact that it [metaphorically] introduces the spark of imagination into 
a “thinking more” at the conceptual [speculative] level”.5 As such, metaphorical 
discourse is the condition of possibility of speculative discourse. That is to say, world-
directed, claim-making speculative discourse can only get underway within the 
play of possibilities created when a concept from one frame of reference is 
applied to another in metaphorical discourse. As Ricoeur makes the point: 
 
On the one hand, speculative discourse has its condition of possibility in 
the semantic dynamism of metaphorical utterance, [while] on the 
other hand, speculative discourse has its necessity in itself, in putting 
the resources of conceptual articulation to work.6 
 
Speculative discourse “has its necessity in itself”, according to Ricoeur, in the sense 
that the resources of conceptual articulation “belong to the mind itself,… are the 
mind itself reflecting upon itself”.7 Despite the stress on interplay, speculative 
discourse is shown to be the principal element in Ricoeur’s theory, since it is the 
mode of discourse which resolves the “nonsensical” possibilities of the 
metaphorical “A is B” into appropriate, worldly meaning; that is to say, it is the 
speculative which assigns metaphor its “ontological vehemence”.8 The 
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interpretation of metaphor, he adds, “is the work of concepts” and 
“consequently a struggle for univocity”.9  
 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of the concept is presented in their 1991 book 
What is Philosophy? as part of an exploration of the nature of philosophy and its 
relationship with art and science. Philosophy, they declare, is “the art of forming, 
inventing, and fabricating concepts”, in the sense, for example, that Kant 
introduces a new concept of time.10 Instead of the Newtonian concept of a linear 
succession of episodes, Kant presents time as a three-fold principle of 
anticipation, retention, and succession, fundamental to the organization of 
experience. Concepts have to be made: they are “not waiting for us ready-made, 
like heavenly bodies. There is no heaven for concepts. They must be invented, 
fabricated, or rather created and would be nothing without their creator’s 
signature”.11 It is philosophy, and only philosophy, that is the creator of concepts. 
“Sciences, arts, and philosophies are all equally creative”, they assert, “although 
only philosophy creates concepts in the strict sense”.12 No account is given of 
what this “strict sense” might be. Reference is made to Nietzsche’s declaration, in 
The Will to Power, that philosophers “must no longer accept concepts as a gift, not 
merely purify and polish them, but first make and create them, present them and 
make them convincing”, and it is pointed out that, although Plato said “Ideas 
must be contemplated”, he nevertheless first “had to create the concept of 
Idea”.13 But these observations remain at the level of stating “philosophers create 
concepts” and go no deeper into explicating the meaning of “strict creation”.  
 
In contrast, art, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is the formation of 
sensations, which they call “percepts” and “affects”. Art, they declare, makes 
experience stand on its own, distinct from the artist and her original experience; 
perception is made to stand on its own, apart from its object, as “percept”, and 
affection is given form distinct from the moment as “affect”. Art is “a being of 
sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself”.14 Science, they maintain, “passes from 
chaotic virtuality to the states of affairs and bodies that actualize it”, which is to say that it 
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creates the functions and functives (components of functions) that allow 
propositions in discursive systems to refer to states of affairs.15  
 
Art, science and philosophy are theorized as part of Deleuze and Guattari’s 
immanent ontology, immanent in that it focuses on experience in itself, as its 
own condition, and not experience which belongs to a subject. As such, the 
component terms introduced above – percept and affect (sensation); functions; 
and concepts – are not items that can be apportioned to either human subjects 
or “real world” objects, but instead occur within their respective “planes” – of 
composition; of reference; and of philosophy – where “plane” does the 
philosophical work of being the field or surface wherein events, i.e. percepts, 
functions, concepts, arise. 
 
The relation between art, science and philosophy, for Deleuze and Guattari, is 
one of “intersection and intertwinement”, with sensation, function, concept, and 
their respective planes, as the participating entities:  
 
[Art, science and philosophy] intersect and intertwine but without 
synthesis or identification. With its concepts, philosophy brings forth 
events. Art erects monuments with its sensations [i.e., percepts and 
affects]. Science constructs states of affairs with its functions. A rich 
tissue of correspondences can be established between the planes. But 
the network has its culminating points, where sensation itself 
becomes sensation of concept or function, where the concept 
becomes concept of function or of sensation, and where the 
function becomes function of sensation or concept. And none of 
these elements can appear without the other being still to come, still 
indeterminate or unknown. Each created element on a plane calls on 
other heterogeneous elements, which are still to be created on other 
planes: thought as heterogenesis.16 
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An example of intersection given by Deleuze and Guattari is the development of 
the thickness of paint in modern art, when “the surface can be furrowed or the 
plane of composition can take on thickness insofar as the material rises up, 
independently of depth or perspective, independently of shadows and even of 
the chromatic order of colour”.17 From here, the philosopher Hubert Damisch 
“turn[s] the thickness of the plane into a genuine concept by showing that 
‘plaiting could well fulfil a role for future painting similar to that performed by 
perspective’”.18 Thus, the percept of thickness becomes a concept of thickness, 
with the potential for connections with other concepts that is intrinsic to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theory of a concept.  
 
Although both Ricoeur and Deleuze and Guattari maintain that their accounts of 
art and philosophy have them in states of interaction and intertwinement, the 
nature of the interaction and intertwinement is different. The fact that Ricoeur 
refers to a mind, belonging to a subject, whereas Deleuze and Guattari present an 
immanent, subject-less ontology, is an important difference, but it does not have 
a bearing on how they understand the connectivity of concepts. The vocabularies 
that are used to articulate their art–philosophy relationships are also not 
influenced by the differences that can be found between a subject–object and an 
immanent ontology. With Ricoeur, metaphor stimulates speculative thought: it 
“introduces the spark of imagination into a “thinking more” at the conceptual 
[speculative] level”.19 Although speculative discourse “has its necessity in itself”, 
“belong[s] to the mind itself” and is “the mind itself reflecting upon itself”, its 
condition of possibility, its mobilization, is given by metaphorical discourse.  
 
In contrast, with Deleuze and Guattari, despite the claim for “intersection and 
intertwinement” between art and philosophy, there is a propriety at work that 
tries to ensure that each way of thinking remains on its own plane. With the 
Damisch example above, it is the philosopher and not the artist or art theorist 
who creates the concept of plaiting, despite artists’ pursuit of medium-specificity 
prior to the philosopher’s 1984 publication. “Art thinks no less than philosophy”, 
Deleuze and Guattari maintain, “but it thinks through percepts and affects”. 
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This, they are keen to point out, “does not mean that the two entities do not 
often pass into each other in a becoming that sweeps them both up in an 
intensity which co-determines them”.20 Yet when it comes to describing this 
“passing into each other”, it is not clear what the “passing” amounts to. At this 
point, they refer to the work of Michel Guérin who, on his own website, 
describes himself as a writer and a philosopher, so straight away it is uncertain 
whether we are dealing with an artist (as writer) or a philosopher.21 To serve 
Deleuze and Guattari’s illustration, he needs to be a philosopher. They declare 
that Guérin makes “a profound discovery of the existence of conceptual 
personae [concepts with the power to determine the course of a philosopher’s 
work]22 at the heart of philosophy”. But rather than articulate these conceptual 
personae conceptually, Guérin presents them 
 
within a “logodrama” or a “figurology” that puts affect into thought. 
This means that the concept as such can be the concept of an affect, 
just as the affect can be the affect of the concept. The plane of 
composition of art and the plane of immanence of philosophy can 
slip into each other to the degree that parts of one may be occupied 
by entities of the other [au point que des pans de l’un soient occupés par des 
entités de l’autre]. In fact, in each case the plane and that which 
occupies it are like two relatively distinct and heterogeneous parts. A 
thinker may therefore decisively modify what thinking means, draw 
up a new image of thought, and institute a new plane of immanence. 
But, instead of creating new concepts that occupy it, they populate it 
with other instances, with other poetic, novelistic, or even pictorial or 
musical entities [mais, au lieu de créer de nouveaux concepts qui l’occupent, il le 
peuple avec d’autres instances, d’autres entités, poétiques, romanesques, ou même 
picturales ou musicales].23 
 
But at the very moment when it would be helpful to see how Deleuze and 
Guattari’s vocabulary of percepts, affects and concepts enables the description of 
the intersection and intertwinement of art and philosophy, they are not to be 
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seen. Instead, a general description is given in terms of “other instances, with 
other poetic, novelistic, or even pictorial or musical entities”. But where do such 
“entities” sit within Deleuze and Guattari’s system? They are presumably not 
concepts, as we are told that, on this occasion, the philosopher chooses not to 
create a concept. Are they percepts or affects? Perhaps the latter, since we are 
told that Guérin puts “affect into thought”. But what is the effect of putting 
“affect into thought”? With Ricoeur, while he identifies two discourses, 
metaphorical and speculative, their intersection is explained through the former 
being the generation of heterogeneous possibilities that call upon the unifying 
power of the latter. But with Deleuze and Guattari, they have at this crucial point 
to rely upon the general notions of “other poetic, novelistic, or even pictorial or 
musical entities”. Any hope that their notions of the intersection and 
intertwinement of art and philosophy might be articulated further is dashed by a 
propriety which ensures that concept and affect remain “like two relatively 
distinct and heterogeneous parts”, with the “each to its own” impulse reinforced 




The connectivity of concepts 
 
Let us turn our attention to the theories of the connectivity of concepts that are 
given by Ricoeur and Deleuze and Guattari. The ways in which they formulate 
connectivity and the notion of a “concept” are different. What Ricoeur understands by 
the notion can be extracted from his theory of metaphor. Ricoeur works from 
the perspective of the interactionist theory of metaphor developed by Max Black 
(1962, 1979).24 Central to the interactionist account is the idea that metaphor is 
creative: the interaction between its two subject terms provides the condition for 
a meaning which neither of the subject terms possesses independently of the 
metaphorical context. The interaction, as a process, brings into being what Black 
terms an “implication-complex”,25 a system of associated implications shared by 
the linguistic community as well as an impulse of free meaning, free in that it is 
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meaning which was unavailable prior to the metaphor’s introduction. Somehow, 
interaction admits a meaning that is not already deducible from or present in the 
lexicon of a community. The creativity of metaphor is described by Ricoeur in 
the following terms: 
 
Does not the fittingness [of metaphor]… indicate that language not 
only has organized reality in a different way, but also made manifest a 
way of being of things, which is brought to language thanks to 
semantic innovation? It would seem that the enigma of metaphorical 
discourse is that it “invents” in both senses of the word: what it 
creates, it discovers; and what it finds, it invents.26 
 
Metaphor has the double aspect of being both creation and discovery because 
when two terms are juxtaposed unconventionally in a metaphor, metaphorical 
discourse emphasizes the surprise and the novelty of the combination, while 
speculative discourse seeks to make sense of it by working through all the ways in 
which “A is B” might refer to A now that the idea of it has been transformed by 
its new B-nature. 
 
The model for the metaphorical–speculative contrast is the distinction drawn by 
Gottlob Frege in 1892 between “sense” and “reference”.27 Frege makes the 
distinction to show that words with the same reference can nevertheless have 
different senses, for example, “Venus”, “Morning Star” and “Evening Star” all 
refer to the same celestial object, but their senses – the qualities that might 
prompt a writer to choose one over the others, such as association, mood, 
character – are very different. However, for Ricoeur, there is a dynamic interplay 
between sense and reference. The site of the interplay is predication: the creation 
of a sentence by attaching a verb or a verb-phrase to a noun, as in “the cat 
sleeps”, “the electron orbits the nucleus”. “In ordinary language”, he explains, 
 
we master the predicative use of abstract meanings only by relating 
them to objects, which we designate in the referential mode. This is 
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possible because the predicate is such that it performs its 
characteristic function only in the context of the sentence, when it 
targets this or that relatively isolatable aspect within a determined 
referent... So we master meaning by varying the conditions of use in 
relation to different referents. Conversely, we investigate new 
referents only by describing them as precisely as possible. Thus the 
referential field can extend beyond the things we are able to show, 
and even beyond visible, perceptible things. Language lends itself to 
this by allowing the construction of complex referential expressions 
using abstract terms that are already understood, i.e. definite 
descriptions in Russell’s sense. In this way, predication and reference 
lend support to one another, whether we relate new predicates to 
familiar referents, or whether, in order to explore a referential field 
that is not directly accessible, we use predicative expressions whose 
sense has already been mastered.28 
 
The sense of a word, how we understand it in the abstract as a concept and the 
possible uses to which it might be put, is made apparent through the objects that 
the word can be used to describe and, reciprocally, the reference of a word, the 
object that a word can be used to describe, is conveyed through a description 
that uses words the senses of which we understand. For Ricoeur, sense and 
reference are not just complementary terms which happen to form a partnership 
but elements which are fused together in a “continuing Odyssey”:29 established 
referents help to determine sense, and established senses help to determine 
referents. The application of this interplay to metaphorical and speculative 
discourse, the prime movers in this Odyssey, is evident in the final sentence of 
the quotation: the two discourses sustain one another through relating new 
predicates to familiar referents (the formation of concepts in speculative 
discourse), or by using predicative expressions whose sense has already been 
mastered to open up a new referential field (the unconventional but generative 
combination of terms in metaphorical discourse). Thus, the capacity of a concept 
to be a concept, to apply to the things it does in a familiar, referential way, is 
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conditional upon its capacity to be stretched and extended on to other things. Speculative 
discourse, the domain of the concept and claim-making, has metaphorical 
discourse as its condition of possibility because it is the field of possible meanings 
generated by metaphorical discourse that provides the ground whereupon a 
concept can set to work as a concept, showing how some of these meanings can 
be drawn upon to form a novel, insightful claim about the world.30 
 
I suggest that Ricoeur’s account of the concept amounts to visualizing concepts 
not as containers but as being “tentacled” (my term): a concept is only a concept 
if it is predisposed to connect with others, and open to being stretched and 
creatively misapplied. I recommend depicting or diagramming the concept as an 
octopus or jellyfish or echinoderm (one variety of which is the starfish): any 
creature with a central body, to signify that something particular is being referred 
to, but surrounded by tentacles that reach out to make contact with other 
creatures or conditions. Visually, jellyfish and some echinoderms are probably 
better suited to displaying a centre with radial tentacles, but I think the notion of 
an “octopus concept” is more potent, if only because of its “oct”–”con” 
assonance, and the rhythm of its consonance. 
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the concept is a principle of connection, both 
internally and externally, that is to say, a concept is made of other concepts 
internally, while also reaching out to other concepts externally. They refer to 
these aspects respectively as the “endoconsistency” (endo-consistance) and the 
“exoconsistency” (exo-consistance) of the concept.31 The endoconsistency of a 
concept is defined by the “inseparability” of the components that make up the 
inside of the concept.32 An example is the concept of “other person” which 
includes the concepts of “face” and of “our passing from one world to another” 
(in the sense that we recognize another person as having their own world or life-
world). The exoconsistency of the concept is its capacity to form “bridges” with 
other concepts.33 The exoconsistency of the concept “other person” might be 
the “expression of a possible world in a perceptual field” and “the possible 
occupants of this field, perceived in a new way”. The internal and external 
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consistencies of the concept are such that each concept “partially overlaps, has a 
zone of neighbourhood [zone de voisinage], or a threshold of indiscernibility with 
another one”.34 Yet each concept is also “in a state of survey [survol] in relation to 
its components, endlessly traversing them according to an order without 
distance”.35 Deleuze and Guattari summarize the point by announcing that 
“zones and bridges are the joints of the concept”, “les zones et les ponts sont les joints 
du concept”.36 It is because a concept is made of other concepts internally, while 
also reaching out to other concepts externally, that it is never finite, definite or 
ultimately definable. Rather, it is always a becoming, always in a state of having its 
endoconsistency and exoconsistency flexed by the push-and-pull of history, 
problems and situations, and the formation of new concepts, whose own 
endoconsistencies and exoconsistencies go on to join the process.  
 
There is a similarity between the models of the concept given by Ricoeur and 
Deleuze and Guattari. Both present the concept as a double action that combines 
components gathering together to form a neighbourhood with a capacity to 
extend to concepts that are considered to be beyond that neighbourhood. 
However, there are two differences. The first concerns the distance covered by 
the external reach of a concept. Firstly, with Ricoeur, the capacity of a concept to 
apply to the things it does in a familiar, referential way, is conditional upon its 
capacity to be stretched and extended onto other, remote things in a metaphor. 
This is a defining property of metaphor: the description of one thing in terms of 
a concept that is ordinarily considered to be remote from it. The flexibility that 
enables a concept to be applied in intricate and specific ways in what becomes a 
“home” referential field is also the flexibility that enables it to leap across to an 
alien field of sense. However, with Deleuze and Guattari, the contrast between 
endoconsistency and exoconsistency is characterized simply in terms of internal 
and external, and not local and remote. We are told that, in terms of its 
exoconsistency, the concept is “in a state of survey [survol] in relation to its 
components, endlessly traversing them according to an order without distance”, 
but “without distance” is not “remoteness”.37 “An order without distance” 
suggests that questions of proximity are not relevant to the concept’s external 
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connections. The two consistencies are likened to “zones and bridges” 
respectively, but it is uncertain how the “bridge” metaphor is to be interpreted. A 
bridge usually connects neighbours who are separated by an obstacle or other 
intervening object, such as water or parts of a city that need to be traversed at 
speed, but does normally connect remote regions. If “neighbourhood” is a 
property of endoconcistency, and “bridging” is a metaphor for exoconsistency, 
then it is reasonable to assume that exoconcistency can be thought 
metaphorically in spatial terms. It is just that the only spatial quality that Deleuze 
and Guattari make significant is externality, rather than proximity or remoteness. 
Although remoteness is not identified with exoconsistency, it is included 
elsewhere within Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy as “lines of flight”, “the 
openings that”, as Tomlinson and Burchell describe them, “allow thought to 
escape from the constraints that seek to define and enclose creativity”, but these 
are not explicitly identified with the exoconcistency of the concept.38 
 
The second difference is that, with Deleuze and Guattari, the double action is 
merely stated: a concept has an endoconsistency and an exoconsistency. They 
have to identify “exoconsistency” as a “bridging” action, whereas with Ricoeur 
the connectivity is already contained within the concentration–extension relation 
of the octopus. With Ricoeur, each part of the action is dependent on another: 
the two discourses sustain one another through relating new predicates to 
familiar referents (the formation of concepts in speculative discourse), or by 
using predicative expressions whose sense has already been mastered to open up 
a new referential field (the combination of terms in metaphor). Deleuze and 
Guattari do refer to the concept possessing an “inseparability”, but this is with 
regard to the “zones, thresholds, or becomings” that constitute the concept’s 




Reference versus connection 
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The difference is deepened by Deleuze and Guattari when they announce that a 
concept cannot be subject to the requirement of reference, that is to say, a 
concept cannot be required to refer to an entity that predates the concept’s own 
coming into being. This, according to Deleuze and Guattari, is what happens in 
science: “the object of science is not concepts but rather functions that are 
presented as propositions in discursive systems”, and logic is the process that 
“wants to turn concepts into functions”.40 Logic does this, they maintain, by 
creating “one or more ‘ordered pairs’” between concepts so that “a relation of 
dependence or correspondence (necessary reason) defines the function”. 
“Dependence” is meant here in the sense that the function, for example, “is a 
man” depends upon an independent variable for its completion, e.g. “John”, to 
give “John is a man”. “Correspondence” is meant here in the sense that, in order 
for the function to have a truth value, i.e. to be either true or false, it has to refer 
to one member of the set of objects that can determine the truth or falsity of the 
function, i.e. one member of the set of objects that constitutes the extension of 
the function. But, Deleuze and Guattari assert, 
 
in becoming propositional, the concept loses all the characteristics it possessed as 
[a] philosophical concept: its self-reference, its endoconsistency and its 
exoconsistency. This is because a regime of independence (of 
variables, axioms, and undecidable propositions) has replaced that of 
inseparability… The concept in general no longer has a combination 
but an arithmetical number; the undecidable no longer indicates the 
inseparability of intensional components (zone of indiscernibility) 
but, on the contrary, the necessity of distinguishing them according 
to the requirements of reference, which renders all consistency (self-
consistency) “uncertain”.41 
 
The philosophical concept, for Deleuze and Guattari, brings into being its own 
self-reference in terms of the component concepts that are inseparable from its 
internal consistency, and in terms of the component concepts it “traverses” 
externally “according to an order without distance”.42 The endoconsistent and 
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exoconsistent possibilities that exist within conceptual self-reference are lost as 
soon as a concept is used in a proposition to determine whether or not 
something is the case. This something will not be part of the philosophical, self-
referential inseparability, but will be an independent, already existing object, 
studied purely in binary terms to determine whether or not the proposition is 
true or false, to determine whether or not an object is a member of a set. It is 
perhaps unsurprising to find that, when it comes to illustrating the fact that 
propositions refer beyond themselves to already-existing objects in the world, 
Deleuze and Guattari allude to Frege’s example from “On sense and reference”: 
“Venus (the evening star and the morning star) is a planet that takes less time 
than the earth to complete its revolution”.43 
 
So Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of a concept cannot be a referring expression 
because, as they see it, reference directs thought away from the concept’s 
connection-generating, internal and external consistencies, and towards an item in 
the world with the sole interest of determining whether it establishes the truth or 
falsity of a proposition. In contrast, reference for Ricoeur is all the applications 
that the concept receives in speculative, claim-making discourse that allow it to 
acquire rich and varied associations, and it is these associations that in turn go on 
to become the tentacles of future, novel connections. Ricoeur has this wider 
understanding of reference: (a) because he considers it in relation to speculative 
discourse, which covers all claim-making discourse, not just scientific; and (b) 
because it is probably a reflection of his phenomenological background and, 
therefore, an expression of a commitment to claim-making discourse being part 
of a life-world of activity. As far as Deleuze and Guattari are concerned, the rub 
here is not so much that their territorialism treats reference as being a one-
dimensional, scientific interest, but that they dismiss reference because it 
introduces pre-existing properties, and these would interfere with or cancel the 
novelty created by a new concept.  
 
But the stance against a referring concept on the grounds that it introduces 
qualities attached to pre-existing objects that countermand the novelty and 
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particularity of the new concept is puzzling, because Deleuze and Guattari 
understand the new concept to be constituted by its internal and external 
connections with other, pre-existent concepts. So why is contact with pre-existent 
concepts that present themselves through reference distinct from pre-existent 
concepts that come from thought? The difference is not a matter of pre-
existence, since this is a property that both kinds of concept share. The nearest 
that Deleuze and Guattari get to explaining the point is the claim (quoted earlier) 
that, with the referring concept, “the necessity of distinguishing [its components] 
according to the requirements of reference… renders all consistency (self-
consistency) ‘uncertain’”.44 But why should the “requirements of reference” make 
self-referring self-consistency “uncertain”, especially if it is recognized that self-
referring self-consistency, on Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, involves connections 
internally and externally with other concepts? The only explanation would appear 
to be that Deleuze and Guattari understand reference to admit connections or 
consistencies that are less forceful in terms of generating further, novel, internal 
and external connections than those made in thought alone. But this seems to be 
the product of a narrow perception of reference. It cannot be denied that there 
are occasions when reference is made solely with the ambition of determining, 
for example, whether or not Venus is a member of the set of planets that “takes 
less time than the earth to complete its revolution”. But this is not the full extent 
of the meaningfulness of reference. Reference can be made when one wants to 
call attention to an object, or to individuate a particular aspect of an object, or to 
explain the operation of an object, or to propose a new property for an object, or 
to place an object in relation to another object. In short, there is a wide network 
of possible situations in which reference occurs, and it is this network of uses 
that Ricoeur appeals to, via Frege, as part of his claim that “predication and 
reference lend support to one another”.45  
 
The problem with Deleuze and Guattari’s position is that it prevents the concept 
from being subject to the force of other concepts that reference and observation 
(for observation also involves reference) can supply. It suggests that observations 
made of objects in the world are somehow lacking when it comes to creating 
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connections that can form endoconsistencies and exoconsistencies. It is as if they 
think that the potential for conceptual connection will be impeded by 
description’s attachment to material things. But this fails to recognize the breadth 
and diversity of description that can be brought by aesthetic judgment and 
metaphor. Although it is not surprising that metaphor does not feature in their 
account, given their dismissal of it in Kafka: Toward a Minor Literature. They 
dismiss it on the grounds that it is restricted to making connections between a 
proper meaning and a figurative meaning.46 But this is a narrow understanding of 
metaphor. It is in the spirit of I.A. Richards’ account, where it is taken to be a 
one-way process of ascription, borrowing properties from an object, the 
“vehicle”, and applying them figuratively to a subject, the “tenor”.47 However, 
there are other theories, such as Black’s and Ricoeur’s, that find within the figure 
greater, epistemological and ontological significance. Deleuze and Guattari do 
acknowledge that, through the intersection and intertwinement of art, science 
and philosophy, percepts and functions can become percepts and functions of 
concepts, and that concepts can become concepts of percepts and functions,48 but no 
account is given of how percepts and functions might contribute to the internal 
and external consistency of concepts. Furthermore, the example that Deleuze 
and Guattari give of a percept becoming a concept – in which paint acquires a 
thickness to become the concept of “plaiting” – is art being turned into a 
concept by a philosopher, as if the philosopher’s proficiency in concept-
formation is necessary in order to realize the potential to become a concept 
within the percept. The irony of What is Philosophy? is that a project which claims 
to place art, science and philosophy in a state of intertwinement finds itself 
largely confining each subject’s component terms within their own territories. 
One cannot but help think that the philosophers who are so keen to advocate 
projects of deterritorialization do so largely because their own thinking is 
determined by operations that are confined to their territories.  
 
One way to sharpen the contrast between Ricoeur’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
approaches to the connectivity of concepts, I propose, is to introduce the 
showing–saying distinction: Ricoeur shows the connectivity of concepts while 
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Deleuze and Guattari say it. In philosophy, the showing–saying distinction is 
most commonly associated with Ludwig Wittgenstein’s project, in the Tractatus 
Logico-Philosophicus, to demonstrate that propositions can only show the 
relationship they have with the world, and not say it.49 However, I am adopting 
the distinction in a different (but possibly related) sense as it is used in the arts, 
especially in drama, to distinguish between meanings that occur respectively in 
either a diegetic or a non-diegetic way. With the former, meaning is shown 
through elements that are already present on the stage, in the world of the play, 
e.g. characters, dialogue, props, scenery, whereas with the latter, meaning is 
stated, usually by a narrator who is outside the world of the play, using words 
that are comparatively remote from the scene, and that do not draw upon any of 
the potential for meaning that is offered by the scene. For example, a character 
might show anxiety through her posture, her downward glance, her silence and the 
tightness with which she grasps a garment owned by her missing partner, while 
the same emotion might be stated, albeit with less effect, by a narrator saying 
“Pearl waits anxiously for her missing partner to return”. The significance of the 
showing–saying distinction is that it can demonstrate the depth with which 
conceptual connectivity is located in the philosophers’ respective ontologies and, 
within this, it can help to reveal the value of conceptual connectivity for that 
ontology. The action of “showing” emphasizes that elements already in play 
contain the resources necessary to generate meanings that exceed what those 
elements are ordinarily taken to be, as in the tightness with which a garment is 
grasped becoming an expression of anxiety.  
 
I think Ricoeur’s account shows connectivity because he is able, via Frege, to rely 
upon the mutually defining, octopus-like processes of concentration through 
reference and extension through metaphor that are already underway in the world. It is 
precisely because the processes are mutually defining and at work in the world 
that he does not have to nominalize it and introduce an ontological coinage that 
is external to the in-the-world push-and-pull of concentration and extension. 
This may well be an expression of Ricoeur’s phenomenological heritage: to find 
within the detail that grows with words in use the force that motivates a process in which 
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part of the world is seen anew. The phenomenological heritage here is the recognition 
that whatever is in use, by dint of the fact that it is used and at the centre of a 
series of social and bodily interactions, acquires the capacity to disclose meaning 
and understanding in ways that far exceed its use. In terms of metaphor, the 
detail that grows with words in use becomes the force that enables a word to leap 
over into an entirely remote realm to become the basis of a figure that illuminates 
the new realm through the detail it acquired from its home territory.  
 
With Ricoeur, the “already in play” nature of his theory is exhibited by the 
octopus-like nature of the concept: what is concentrated in one area becomes the 
motivation for the tentacles reaching out to other areas. The precision and 
observation that come with reference are effectively preparing for the moment 
when the referring expression shoots out, tentacle-like, to become the origin of 
new sense when applied to another concept that, in turn, creates a new referent. 
This means that any careful looking or thoughtful reflection that might be 
devoted to one area of life, as well as providing insight into that area of life, will 
also be laying out precise description that has the potential to become the lens 
through which an alien concept might be viewed in the future. On this 
understanding, the depth with which conceptual connectivity is located within 
Ricoeur’s ontology is such that connectivity and ontology amount to the same 
thing: each and every concept can in principle be part of the process wherein 
established referents help to generate new meanings, and established meanings 
help to determine referents. The value of conceptual connectivity for Ricoeur’s 
ontology is that it makes prominent the regions of activity where the effects of 
conceptual connectivity can be witnessed or appreciated: establishing referents in 
detail, and generating new meanings from those referents that will go on to 
become new referents. 
 
The fact that Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy amounts to a “saying” of 
conceptual connectivity, I think, means that conceptual connectivity is not deeply 
rooted within their ontology. Theirs is an ontology of immanence and becoming 
in which identities (of beings, objects, ideas) are formed through a series of 
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interacting differences, where identities take shape as expressions or intensities or 
folds within this play of difference. Immanence is the “plane” of difference out 
of which identities form; it is, as Colebrook writes, “a pure flow of life and 
perception without any distinct perceivers”.50 “Experience”, for Deleuze and 
Guattari, refers not to experiences of a pre-constituted subject (myself or 
another), but about those events that disrupt experience in a way that my 
subjectivity becomes possible, with the principal forms of experiential disruption 
being percepts, affects and concepts. Experiential disruption is a positive event, 
as far as Deleuze and Guattari are concerned, because it forms the expressions or 
intensities that constitute a life of becoming, a life in which there is no underlying 
substrate or a fixed reference point, but instead sequences of flows, clusterings, 
relations and transitions.  
 
The shallowness of conceptual connectivity within Deleuze and Guattari’s 
ontology is evident in the following ways. While concepts might be one of the 
principal forms of experiential disruption, the possibility that disruption can be 
furthered through one concept connecting with another is limited. Deleuze and 
Guattari have to name exoconsistency as a “bridging” action. There is no 
inherent connection between the “inseparable” components that form 
endoconsistency and the “bridged” components that are taken up through 
exoconsistency. Also, because exoconsistency is “without distance”, there is no 
indication that the heterogeneity might be a remote one, where “remoteness” 
could be an indication of constructive force. In order to introduce an ontology of 
“intersection and intertwinement” between science, art and philosophy, Deleuze 
and Guattari resort to confining them within the respective ontological categories 
of “percept”, “affect” and “concept”, with the possibility of intersection as it 
applies to the concept limited to the possibility that a philosopher identifies a 
respect in which a percept or an affect can be turned into a concept. Again, there 
is no inherent relation between concepts in use as referring expressions, on the 
one hand, and their capacity to reach out to create new senses through their 
application to remote concepts, on the other. Furthermore, the idea that a 
concept might open on to remote meanings is restricted on the understanding 
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that conceptual connectivity is lost as soon as a concept is used as a referring 
expression in a proposition to determine whether or not something is the case.  
 
That Deleuze and Guattari have to state conceptual connectivity also means the 
value of conceptual connectivity for their ontology is put in question. Without 
the mutually defining forces and relations that are available to Ricoeur, Deleuze 
and Guattari are left in a situation where connection seems to happen for 
connection’s sake, and nothing more. We are told that conceptual connection 
occurs, and that this might contribute to the experiential disruptions that create 
the flows, clusterings, relations and transitions in a life of becoming, but the 
particular effects they create or consequences they produce are not spelled out. 
According to Rajchman, the ambition to form conceptual connections for 
Deleuze and Guattari is part of their project against traditional philosophical logic 
(including Fregean logic), cliché and stupidity. This involves them working “with 
zones that are precisely not completely determined or localizing, where things 
may go off in unseen directions or work in unregulated ways”, but what this leads 
to other than the formation of connections is unclear, beyond the suggestion that 
the philosopher can form new concepts based on the affects produced in art. 
Thus, by simply saying that connection occurs, it would appear that no 
accompanying or corresponding ontological structure or elements has been 
introduced that would let the consequences of conceptual connection be 
manifest within the terms of their own ontology. To borrow some phrasing that 
appears in Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the rhizome (which I introduce 
properly below), connection for them is the sequence of “and… and… and…” 
without any pauses in which to enjoy the new meanings and implications that 
spring out from the connections.51 
 
 
Relevance of the rhizome? 
 
Given that What is Philosophy? formulates the relation between art, science and 
philosophy as one of “intersection and intertwinement”, it is surprising that the 
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book does not mention the “rhizome”. In A Thousand Plateaus, from 1980, 
Deleuze and Guattari declare that thought in the history of philosophy is “tree-
like”: individuals are attached to a concept or ideas are attached to a central 
thesis, like branches to a trunk.52 In contrast, they adopt the “rhizome” – an 
underground stem that grows horizontally and pushes up lateral shoots – as a 
model of thought in which claims are linked not by continuous, vertical 
progression, but instead through leaps of association and the relation of 
seemingly unconnected objects or ideas. The rhizome is a “principle of 
connection and heterogeneity”: “any point of a rhizome”, they declare, “can be 
connected to anything other, and must be. This is very different from the tree or 
root, which plots a point, fixes an order”.53 Why a rhizome “must be” connected 
to anything other is not explained, so it is not apparent whether the necessity is 
simply biological or a property of the connectivity that they are ascribing to 
rhizomatic thinking. However, a further account of its operation is provided:  
 
A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic 
chains, organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, 
sciences, and social struggles. A semiotic chain is like a tuber 
agglomerating very diverse acts, not only linguistic, but also 
perceptive, mimetic, gestural, and cognitive: there is no language in 
itself, nor are there any linguistic universals, only a throng of dialects, 
patois, slangs, and specialized languages.54 
 
While it is clear that the rhizome is a principle of connection, it is not apparent 
where it stands in terms of the distinction between art, science and philosophy, 
and their respective units of operation, affect, percept and concept. If a rhizome 
“ceaselessly establishes connections” in this way, including connections between 
“circumstances relative to the arts, sciences, and social struggles”, then it would 
seem that the rhizome might be able to create connections between affect, 
percept and concept, but it’s not apparent how. For example, might it assist in 
generating percepts of concepts, and concepts of percepts?  
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However, one reason why the rhizome does not warrant comparison alongside 
Deleuze and Guattari’s percept–affect–concept terminology is that it is a more 
generalized principle of connection than the specific, three-term ontology given 
in What is Philosophy? A good indication of the range of connection included by 
the rhizome is the example of the relationship between a wasp and an orchid: 
“the wasp is… deterritorialized, becoming a piece in the orchid’s reproductive 
apparatus. But it reterritorializes the orchid by transporting its pollen. Wasp and 
orchid, as heterogeneous elements, form a rhizome”.55 So as well as forming 
connections through “agglomerating… [the] linguistic,… perceptive, mimetic, 
gestural, and cognitive”, it would seem that rhizomic connection can also be 
based on ecological or environmental relationships between organisms. Its 
“connect everything” status is affirmed when Deleuze and Guattari announce 
that the rhizome  
 
has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between things, 
interbeing, intermezzo. The tree is filiation, but the rhizome is alliance, 
uniquely alliance. The tree imposes the verb “to be”, but the fabric of 
the rhizome is the conjunction, “and… and… and…”.56 
 
The movement that is “always between”, that is “and… and… and…”, presents 
the rhizome as a general notion of connection, without any suggestion of a 
process that corresponds to the actions of endoconsistency and exoconsistency, 
i.e. a process whereby a concept is made of other concepts internally, while also 
reaching out to other concepts externally. As such, there is nothing that can be 
drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s account of the rhizome that could inform 
the specific terms with which they articulate their theory of the concept in What 
is Philosophy? 
 
One aside to observe is that the rhizome is wholly at odds with Ricoeur’s 
thinking on conceptual connectivity. The tree represents the traditional structure 
of philosophical thinking, as Deleuze and Guattari present it, wherein individuals 
are attached to a central concept like branches to a trunk. In this regard, it is, as 
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they state, a form of filiation, a means of identifying one object with another or 
making one object belong to or descend from another, thereby “imposing” 
statements that assign a predicate to a subject, i.e. “A is B”. The “and… and… 
and…” of rhizomic conjunction is set against this in order, ultimately, to 
encourage modes of thinking that produce multiple “determinations, magnitudes, 
and dimensions”, called “multiplicities”, in opposition to the singular definitions 
and accounts promoted by tree-like thinking. So filiation and alliance are 
antagonistic opposites for Deleuze and Guattari. However, for Ricoeur, they are 
the mutually defining properties of speculative reference and metaphorical 
extension, with the specialization that comes with reference providing the many 
cognitive interactions that drive a metaphor’s capacity to create a novel 
perspective on a subject. This means Ricoeur can explain what happens when a 
metaphor is created, and provide a picture of a world where sense and reference 
are fused together with established referents helping to generate new meanings, 
and established meanings help to determine new referents. In contrast, with the 
rhizome, it is not clear what connection involves, other than elements coming 
together in ways that are different from linear, conceptual ordering. The effect of 
the conjunction is also not apparent: each new connection seems only to add 
another “and” to the list, but do nothing in the direction of making a conceptual 





Ricoeur and Deleuze and Guattari provide two different theories of the concept 
acting not just though its capacity to bind together, but also through its capacity 
to connect with other concepts. However, the concepts will be “neighbouring” 
or “bridged” with Deleuze and Guattari, and “remote” or “unrelated” with 
Ricoeur.57 Because the relation between art and philosophy is integral to their 
theories, they also present two different pictures of the art–philosophy relation. 
Ricoeur’s theory shows conceptual connectivity, whereas Deleuze and Guattari’s 
merely says it. The “showing” for Ricoeur arises through his account being 
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structured by a relation of mutual dependence. The result is a model of the 
concept that I have named the “octopus”. The capacity to be a concept, to apply 
to the things it does in a familiar, referential, concentrated way, is conditional upon 
its capacity to be stretched and extended onto other things. This is the basis of Ricoeur’s 
theory of metaphor and his picture of the relation between art and philosophy: 
the intersection of speculative, claim-making discourse that “expresses the 
systematic nature of the conceptual”, and metaphorical discourse that applies one 
concept to another in a new, unexpected way. The result is an ontology in which 
metaphor is a “continuing Odyssey” “determining more rigorously the 
conceptual traits of reality” while at the same time “making [new] referents 
appear”.58  
 
For Deleuze and Guattari, the concept is also a principle of connection on 
account of its including elements that are “inseparable”, its endoconsistency, as 
well as elements that have been reached “through the construction of a bridge” 
with another concept, its exoconsistency. However, whereas the contrast for 
Ricoeur is in terms of “near” and “far”, with each side always ready to be 
propelled towards its opposite, i.e. from near to far, the two sides of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s concept are characterized merely as internal zones made up of 
“inseparable components”, and “external” zones, with the manner of their 
connection explained by ascribing to the external zones the role of “joints” that 
can act as “bridges” between the zones. Furthermore, just as the mutual 
dependence of speculative reference and metaphorical sense creates a similar 
tensile relation between art and philosophy for Ricoeur, there is a lack of 
connection between art and philosophy for Deleuze and Guattari, as if to match 
the lack of tension between a concept’s endoconsistency and exoconsistency. 
The concept is the province of philosophy for Deleuze and Guattari, but it is 
only able to engage with art if the affective power of art is turned into a concept 
through the insight of a philosopher. 
 
Arguably the greatest difference between Ricoeur and Deleuze and Guattari is 
over their understanding of reference. With Ricoeur, reference to objects is part 
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of the process whereby a word is put to use in a variety of settings and contexts 
so that, as a result, it acquires a richness of sense that makes it ripe for 
connecting with an altogether new and unfamiliar context. However, for Deleuze 
and Guattari, reference is the application of words to objects conducted with the 
sole interest of determining whether or not the resultant proposition is true or 
false. While this view might accurately reflect a positivist attitude to the formation 
and meaning of propositions, it fails to acknowledge the wider variety of uses that 
reference performs in everyday discourse. It is possibly another symptom of the 
territorialism that informs Deleuze and Guattari’s writing. It is as if they work on 
the understanding that in order to construct an ontology of “intersection and 
intertwinement”, there must first be a terminological framework in which 
elements are confined to narrow roles, so that they can be shown to intersect and 
intertwine across those roles. Except Deleuze and Guattari do not show them to 
be intersecting and intertwining. They state that they connect, but they do not 
show that they do. This is because “showing” requires elements already at work in 
the process under discussion to be agents in the process. It is in this respect that 
I think Ricoeur provides the stronger account of the connectivity of concepts: 
reference is part of the octopus-like structure of the concept, preparing it for the 
moment when it will suddenly shoot out across numerous fields of meaning to 
create an insight in a remote and unrelated territory. 
 
The idea that the nature of concepts is such that they connect with other 
concepts is important because it could have implications for the way identity – 
interpreted as the possession of certain properties as concepts – and predication 
– the ascription of a predicate-concept to a subject-concept – are understood. If 
concepts are no longer regarded as containers holding a set of uniform 
associations or meanings, but as elements that are reaching out to other concepts, 
then any operation that involves concepts, from predication (if concepts are 
understood in a linguistic or propositional sense) to experience (if concepts are 
understood in Kantian terms as shapers of experience), will become an operation 
in which the relationship to otherness is paramount. While this is one of the 
declared aims of Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy – “not to predict, but to 
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remain attentive to the unknown knocking at the door”59 – there is the question 
of how otherness is welcomed into one’s system of thought. Does it simply 
become one more item in a chain of connected othernesses, only to be held in 
awareness until the next “and” comes along? Or might there be the recognition 
that every specialized or precise or attentive concept that we possess holds within 
it the potential to reach out to the alien and the remote and to discover new 
meaning in that domain? 
 
If the nature of concepts is such that their specialized reference in one area gives 
them the density of meaning that allows them to become an array of other, 
remote, seemingly unrelated concepts, then this would seem to place the 
generation of novelty, surprise and, perhaps most importantly at all, significant 
surprise – on the understanding that new metaphors offer significance, as 
opposed to random or indifferent meanings – at the centre of thought. One 
could argue that such creative connection-forming is already associated with the 
arts, but less so with the construction of knowledge and the description of 
everyday affairs, where fidelity to what is proper and accurate is prized over 
novelty and surprise. But if attitudes to concepts could be changed in order to 
acknowledge their tentacled performance, then it is possible that there might be 
greater acceptance of change, difference, and things being other than they seem 
in human affairs and in the world, where “change, difference, and things being 
other than they seem” are taken to be positive attributes in opposition to the 
desire for uniformity and homogeneity that can drive domination and exclusion. 
This would be to realize Ricoeur’s odyssey of sense and reference as an attitude 
to thought that is permanently open to terminological precision in one area of 
discourse being the catalyst for the emergence of new, unforeseen concepts in 
another area. 
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